A “Calvinist” Theory of Matter? Burgersdijk and Descartes on res extensa by Gellera, Giovanni
  
Title Page 
 
 
A “Calvinist” Theory of Matter? Burgersdijk and Descartes on res 
extensa 
 
Giovanni Gellera 
 
ORCID IDENTIFIER 0000-0002-8403-3170 
 
Section de philosophie, Université de Lausanne 
giovanni.gellera@unil.ch 
 
 
The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in 
Intellectual History Review volume 28 (2018), issue 2. Published online 24 
Novembre 2017. 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17496977.2017.1374058 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the Dutch debates on Cartesianism of the 1640s, a minority believed that some Cartesian 
views were in fact Calvinist ones. The paper argues that, among others, a likely precursor of 
this position is the Aristotelian Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635), who held a reductionist view 
of accidents and of the essential extension of matter on Calvinist grounds. It seems unlikely 
that Descartes was unaware of these views. The claim is that Descartes had two aims in his 
Replies to Arnauld: to show the compatibility of res extensa and the Catholic 
transubstantiation but also to differentiate the res extensa from some views of matter 
explicitly defended by some Calvinists. The association with Calvinism will be eventually 
used polemically against Cartesianism, for example in France. The paper finally suggests 
that, notwithstanding the points of conflict, the affinities between the theologically relevant 
theories of accidents, matter and extension ultimately facilitated the dissemination of 
Cartesianism among the Calvinists. 
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In 1651 Count Louis Henry of Nassau demanded that the Dutch universities issue public statements 
on Cartesian philosophy. The professors of the University of Groningen replied, among other things, 
that “long before Descartes, Orthodox theologians have supported several of his ideas,” such as “that 
the general nature and essence of body is extension; that an accident is not a being but something 
which belongs to a being.”1 The letter was written by the rector of the university, Samuel Maresius 
and by the professors Matthias Pasor and Tobias Andreae. Theo Verbeek writes that the favourable 
view of Descartes in the letter suggests the involvement of Johannes Clauberg and Christopher 
Wittichius.2 The relationship between Descartes and the Dutch Calvinists is a complex and much 
debated one. The established general view is captured by Stephen Gaukroger’s words that Descartes 
was opposed more by the Calvinists than by the Catholics, and that “the use of Cartesianism by a 
number of Calvinist theologians in the second half of the seventeenth century” is “perhaps most 
surprising of all, given Descartes’ strong adherence to Catholicism and his general avoidance of 
theological questions.”3 
The querelle between the Voetians and the Cartesians is typically taken as paradigmatic. The 
Groningen professors seem to suggest a different picture. Descartes’s reductionist views on matter and 
accidents are favourably received and are not a threat to Calvinist orthodoxy: that is, they are 
compatible with and unproblematic for Calvinist orthodoxy. In their general, unqualified talk of 
‘Orthodox theologians’ they seem to hint at a wide consensus on their position. While bearing in mind 
that the Groningen professors were actively seeking to cast Descartes in a positive light with the 
authorities, their claim is straightforward and worth investigating. Quite the opposite, these same 
views were deemed problematic by most Catholics, especially by the Roman Church establishment: 
most famously by Antoine Arnauld in the Fourth Objections to Descartes’s Meditationes. 
 The aim of this paper is to investigate one possible case of the “consensus” suggested by the 
Groningen professors: the metaphysics of matter and accidents of the Dutch Calvinist and Aristotelian 
Franco Burgersdijk (1590–1635). Though not a theologian, Burgersdijk was an influential philosophy 
professor and then rector at the University of Leiden until his death in 1635.4 Burgersdijk holds, like 
Descartes, that matter is extended per se and that accidents are inseparable from their substances. As a 
Calvinist, Burgersdijk rejects the Catholic explanation of transubstantiation, which hinges on the 
separability of accidents from their substances. Arguing from his Calvinist belief, Burgersdijk presents 
a reductionist account of matter and quantity, and insists that actual inherence in the substance is an 
essential property of accidents. Descartes argues that matter is extended per se. As a Catholic, he is 
committed to the dogma of transubstantiation but takes exception with the philosophical (i.e., 
scholastic) account. The agreement between Burgersdijk and Descartes is contingent: no unitary 
explanation can be given, for Descartes and Burgersdijk argued that matter is essentially extended for 
different reasons. Nevertheless, contingent and limited to the doctrine of matter and accidents as it is, 
this agreement might help to explain the remarkable absence of Descartes’s signature doctrine of the 
res extensa as an issue in the Dutch debates on Cartesianism. I suggest that the affinity between res 
extensa and Calvinist views might be relevant in two ways. First, in facilitating the reception of 
Cartesianism among the Calvinists, alongside the established argument of the traditional intellectually 
tolerant culture of the United Provinces. Secondly, in representing an additional pressing concern for 
Arnauld about the compatibility of res extensa and transubstantiation and, ultimately, a crucial 
obstacle to the dissemination of Cartesianism among the Catholics. 
 There are good arguments for the importance of Burgersdijk in this context. We are not very well 
informed on pre-Cartesian Dutch philosophy. Burgersdijk in particular has not been the object of 
extensive research,5 and he opens an interesting window on early seventeenth-century Dutch 
academic philosophy. More specifically for Cartesian studies, firstly, Burgersdijk was the teacher of 
Adriaan Heereboord (1613‒1661) who developed an early scholastico-Cartesian philosophy after 
meeting Descartes in 1644.6 Secondly, Descartes himself enrolled at the University of Leiden when 
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Burgersdijk was teaching there.7 It is then unlikely that Descartes was not aware of Burgersdijk’s 
views and of possible affinities with his own (later) position. 
 Reductionist views on matter and accidents were defended before Burgersdijk and Descartes. 
Helen Hattab and Christoph Lüthy have investigated the philosophy of David Gorlaeus (1591‒1612), 
the controversial Dutch Arminian and atomist. A similarity between Gorlaeus and Burgersdijk is that 
Gorlaeus’ anti-scholastic, reductionist, and atomist metaphysics seems to have been influenced by the 
Reformed faith.8 In drawing a comparison between Gorlaeus and Descartes, Hattab suggests that the 
affinities between the two could also be explained “by the fact that he [Descartes] was exposed to the 
same theories taught at the universities of Franeker and Leiden and adopted some of the same 
elements.”9 Lüthy argues for the influence on Gorlaeus of his teacher Henricus De Veno in Leiden.10 
The investigation of Burgersdijk, an important professor in Leiden just at the time of Descartes’s 
arrival in the United Provinces and a different type of intellectual from Gorlaeus, sheds further light 
on this narrative. Unlike Gorlaeus, Burgersdijk defended reductionist views on matter and accidents 
still within the scholastico-Aristotelian substance/accident metaphysics. Further research will help 
assess how popular these views were. 
  The paper is divided into three sections. In the first one, I contextualise Burgersdijk and Descartes 
by introducing the Catholic and Lutheran views on accidents and matter. I argue that the Catholics 
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (1573–1640) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), and the Lutheran 
Christoph Scheibler (1589–1653) were committed to the same view. In the second section, I expound 
Burgersdijk’s views in details. In the third section I argue that Descartes pursued the compatibility of 
res extensa and transubstantiation as well as the differentiation from the Reformed view by means of a 
theory of knowledge of material substances via matter in motion, which dispenses with sensible 
species. The conclusion makes a brief reference to additional sources for and against res extensa: 
Gijsbert Voet (1593‒1680), Paul Voet (1619‒1677), Gilbert Jack (circa 1577‒1628), and the French 
Jesuit Père le Valois (1639−1700). Whereas there is no general agreement among the Calvinists on res 
extensa, the association with Calvinism was used polemically against the Cartesians in France. 
 
The Catholic and Lutheran view11 
According to the Catholics, the miracle of the Eucharist consists in the bread and wine being 
transubstantiated into the body and blood of Christ respectively. The scholastic “explanation” is that 
the accidents of bread and wine persist in existence by divine intervention while their natural 
substances are replaced by the new subjects of inherence, the substances of body and blood.12 
According to the Lutherans, the substances of bread and wine are made to coexist with the body and 
blood of Christ in the host.13 Given these theological differences, it is perhaps surprising to find the 
same philosophical argument in Catholic and Lutheran scholastics. The shared view is that in order to 
make sense of the real presence, under specific circumstances the accidents are separable from their 
natural substances: that is, they can exist without them. Cees Leijenhorst has investigated this 
argument in the Lutheran commitment to the view that a substance can be separable, under certain 
circumstances, from its local place.14 
 This is the position of the Jesuit Francisco Suárez with respect to quantity: 
 
The conclusion that quantity is really different from substance is to be approved. And that has 
to be held universally; although it is not possible to demonstrate it sufficiently by natural 
reason, we are convinced that it is true by Theological principles, in particular because of the 
mystery of the Eucharist.15 
 
Suárez claims that 1) the accident of quantity is really different from substance: they are in a relation 
as between two things, and one can be without the other; and 2) this conclusion is not reached by 
natural reason, but only by the theological evidence of transubstantiation. In order for the same 
accidents to exist before and after the miracle, the accidents have to be separable from their natural 
substances (bread and wine). Only those things which are really different can exist independently of 
one another; so, the accidents (in Suárez’s passage, quantity) and substance are really different. The 
theological premise plays the central role in the argument: natural reason does not guide us to this 
conclusion, but it can explain how the miracle is possible. 
 Eustachius a Sancto Paulo explains the distinction between the aptitudinal and actual inherence of 
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accidents: 
 
Aptitudinal inherence belongs to the formal reason of the accident; truly, actual inherence is 
different from the nature or essence of the accident at least by the nature of the thing. […] 
inherence properly called, which is actual inherence, is different from the nature of the 
accident.16 
 
By definition, an accident inheres in something else: some sort of inherence has to belong to it. The 
distinction between aptitudinal and actual inherence explains how the accidents can exist without their 
substance. An accident aptitudinally inheres when it is in potency toward inhering in a substance, even 
if it is not the case that it presently inheres. On the contrary, actual inherence is a matter, so to speak, 
of empirical evidence: whether an accident actually inheres (that is, in a given substance, at a given 
time) cannot be found by sole inspection of the essence of the accidents. It is the case that some 
accidents do not inhere in a substance, as in transubstantiation. Given the principle that something is 
essential to something else if it cannot be separated from it, the theological evidence dictates that only 
aptitudinal inherence is essential to the accidents because it is the only type of inherence the accidents 
always retain. So, aptitudinal inherence is predicated of all the accidents necessarily, whereas actual 
inherence is predicated contingently of accidents. Actual inherence is just a specific mode of existence 
of the accidents, which can be subtracted from them. 
 What I call the ‘standard Catholic view’ can be summarized in two points: 1) accidents are really 
distinct from their substance (real accidents); and 2) theology, not natural reason, motivates the choice 
for this view. The analysis of the accidents is central because quantity and extension are accidents of 
their substance, matter: so, whatever relation occurs between quantity/extension and matter, it is a 
substance–accident relation.17 
 Christoph Scheibler argues from a Lutheran perspective.18 The coexistence of the host and the 
body of Christ in the same place rules out the impenetrability of bodies, which is grounded on 
extension in place. Scheibler is committed to the view that a body can exist supernaturally separate 
from its natural extension in place. Since extension in place and local place are accidents of 
substances, the accidents are separable from their substances. A body which God makes coexist in the 
same place with another retains its spatial extension only aptitudinally, not actually: God subtracts 
actual spatial extension because it would prevent coexistence in the same place. The body is then only 
aptitudinally (that is, potentially) extended in place. Extension in place is an accident of matter, and 
since matter is separable from actual extension in place, only aptitudinal extension in place is part of 
the essence of matter. 
 Catholic and Lutheran scholastics maintain that accidents naturally inhere in act in their substance: 
this is the sense of Eustachius’s remark that actual inherence is “inherence properly called.” Yet, this 
natural view has an exception: faith instructs us that an accident can exist supernaturally without its 
actual inherence in its natural substance. 
 Abstracting from the scholastic technical terminology, the main point is that the regularities of the 
natural world admit an exception. Philosophy and theology together explain reality, with the miracle 
of the Eucharist acting as a limiting case for the philosophical “natural view”. The modality of the 
claim is what differentiates Eustachius, Suárez, and Scheibler from Burgersdijk and Descartes: 
whereas according to the latter accidents necessarily inhere in their substance, according to the former 
it is possible that they do not inhere. 
 
Franco Burgersdijk: Calvinist metaphysics of matter and accidents 
 
The Calvinist reading of the Eucharist rejects both the Catholic real presence and the Lutheran 
corporeal presence. The Eucharist no longer constitutes the exception to the “natural view” that 
accidents essentially inhere in their substance and that matter is always extended because no 
physically relevant miracle occurs. Calvinist scholastics thus rejected the Catholic and Lutheran 
philosophical arguments along with the theological ones. 
 Burgersdijk’s theory of accidents and matter is found in the Institutionum metaphysicarum, 
especially Book 1, chapter 7 (‘De modis Entium’), chapter 14 (‘De speciebus et gradibus Unitatis’), 
chapter 15 (‘De Diversitate sive Distinctione et convenientia’), and Book 2, chapter 17 (‘De 
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Accidente’).19 Burgersdijk holds that matter is extended per se. He reaches this conclusion by denying 
that quantity is 1) an accident and 2) a mode of matter. The view that quantity is an accident of matter 
is central to the Catholic and Lutheran views: only qua accident can quantity be separable from 
matter. It is worth expounding Burgersdijk’s philosophy in some details considering how little known 
it is. 
 Burgersdijk claims that only some qualities are ‘real’ or ‘true’ accidents and equates ‘accidents’ 
with ‘real accidents’ (2, 17, 6 and 12). In order for an accident to be ‘real’, it has to be “really distinct 
from the substance in which it inheres.” The only accidents that Burgersdijk accepts are a certain type 
of real qualities so he defends a version of the ‘real accidents’ theory.20 Since only certain types of 
qualities are real accident, and quantity by definition is not a quality, it is concluded that quantity is 
not a real accident. Which is the same to say that quantity is not an accident at all. 
Accidents are those beings “which are attributed to substances and nonetheless are not included in 
their definitions.”21 It is essential to accidents that they inhere in a substance: they are “in something, 
not as parts [of it]” (in aliquo, non ut pars). The type of inherence here is not potential or aptitudinal, 
but actual. An accident cannot exist without the substance in which it inheres, because its being is 
‘being–in’ (ejus esse est inesse).22 The impossibility of a separate existence is entailed by the essence 
of the accident: in fact, an accident depends on its substance with respect to 1) affecting the substance: 
‘accident’ is something which affects something else, in a functional definition; and 2) conservation: 
an accident is maintained into existence by its substance. So, the accident is wholly defined in relation 
to its substance. 
 Burgersdijk’s strategy against the Catholic view is a reductio: he reaches the conclusion that matter 
is extended per se by showing that the assumptions that 1) accidents can exist without their 
substances, and 2) quantity is an accident or a mode, lead to contradiction. On Burgersdijk’s account, 
an accident: (i) essentially inheres in a substance and (ii) is really distinct from the substance. The 
standard Catholic view would typically reject point (i): as we have seen, in order to be separable an 
accident cannot inhere in its substance essentially; and accept point (ii), with the crucial qualification 
that real distinction entails (the possibility of) separate existence. 
 Regarding point (i), Burgersdijk replies to the Catholic view in sections 17–18. The Catholic view 
concedes that although an accident cannot naturally exist without a substance, nonetheless by God’s 
causality (concursus extraordinarius) an accident can exist without its natural substance. Burgersdijk 
believes that this involves a contradiction in the nature of accidents and an offense to God. The 
contradiction arises from the confusion between substance and accident. Every being is either a 
substance or an accident: that is, the distinction substance–accident is jointly exhaustive of all possible 
modes of existence. So, what does not inhere in a substance is not an accident and is, by definition, a 
substance. ‘Subsistence per se’ and ‘subsistence in something else’ are in immediate opposition, and 
an accident which did not inhere in its subject would be an ‘accident non-accident’.23 Only substances 
have independent existence, so the Catholic ‘real’ accidents would contradict the nature of the 
accidents by ascribing to them a mode of existence proper of substances. Secondly, this line of 
argumentation constitutes an offense to God. The type of divine intervention invoked by the Catholics 
would entail that God acts as a material cause because God supplies for the missing material cause of 
the accidents: their natural substance. If God replaces the material cause, then God becomes the 
subject of the accidents; also, material causality is the least perfect causality, so it signifies an 
imperfection unworthy of God.24 Thus, Burgersdijk argues against the Catholic scholastic theory of 
accidents from a Calvinist standpoint: accidents cannot exist without their natural substances and the 
type of miracle invoked by the Catholics is unworthy of God. 
 On Burgersdijk’s view, quantity is not an accident of matter; even if it were, it would not be 
separable from matter because no accident is. Regarding point (ii), Burgersdijk denies that ‘real 
difference’ entails ‘separate existence’. In Book 1, chapter 15 he lists two types of distinctions: 
rationis (‘of/by reason’) and ex natura rei (‘on account of the nature of the thing’). Distinction ex 
natura rei is grounded in the nature of things, independent of the intellect, and includes real and 
modal distinction. Our intellect perceives this distinction in virtue of the separateness of the two terms 
of the distinction: it follows that “those things which are separable, are also distinct based on the 
nature of the thing.” Two things are ‘separable’ if they can exist “in different places and times,” like 
those things which are really distinct subjects or in really distinct subjects.25 Crucially, this distinction 
is not coextensive with “existing without the other” (existere sine altero), for there are distinctions of 
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reason in which “one being is without the other.”26 Burgersdijk concludes that we should not equate 
‘separability’ with ‘independent existence’, even if “many quite rashly claim so” (a multis temere sit 
assertum): he arguably has the Catholics in mind here.27 So, two things which are distinct ex natura 
rei are not necessarily separable (in the sense of independent existence). This is precisely the case of 
the ‘real’ accidents in Burgersdijk’s sense: even if they are distinct ex natura rei from their substance 
(because they have different essences), they cannot exist independently of them. The reality of the 
accidents does not commit Burgersdijk to the separability claim, which grounds the Catholic analysis 
of transubstantiation.28 
 What marks Burgersdijk’s theory of accidents as ‘Calvinist’ is the rejection of the Catholic 
scholastic definition of accident as separable from their substance. Burgersdijk holds a reductionist 
account of accidents: a property of a substance is either a real accident or a mode.29 Yet, beyond 
verbal agreement, he profoundly revises the Catholic ‘real accidents’ to include only certain types of 
quality and to exclude separate or independent existence. So, if quantity were a (real) accident, then it 
would essentially inhere in its substance, contra the Catholics. 
 We have seen that for Burgersdijk quantity is not an accident. Following Porphyry, the scholastics 
traditionally posited a third type of being between substances and accidents: modes. Whereas we can 
conceive of a substance without an accident, we cannot conceive of a substance without a mode. The 
essence of a mode is not identical with the essence of the substance but it depends on it essentially. 
Unlike the accidents, all scholastics agree that modes cannot have a separate existence, not even by 
divine power. A mode seems to be a good candidate to explain the relation quantity has to matter, once 
the accidental relation has been discarded. Burgersdijk’s theory of modes is found in Book 1, chapter 
7. A mode is “a positive, inner and absolute appendix, by which the modified thing is limited, both in 
terms of its being and in terms of its becoming.”30 This excludes it from the number of beings: in fact, 
since substance and accidents are jointly exhaustive of ‘being’, there is no logical space for a third 
type of being. Burgersdijk’s example is ‘self-subsistence’. This mode distinguishes a substance from 
an accident, because only a substance can exist per se. This mode cannot be the same as the substance 
because it does not signify the substance, and because the composition entails a distinction of the 
natures to be composed;31 neither can it be the same as an accident, because an accident cannot 
distinguish a substance from an accident (while the modes do). So, modes are not ‘real’ beings, that is, 
they are neither substances nor accidents. They are ways in which the substances is, and provide 
‘limitation’ or ‘determination’ to the substance. 
 It is Burgersdijk’s contention that quantity is neither a mode nor an accident of matter. The main 
argument is found in Book 2, chapter 17, section 6. By elimination Burgersdijk argues that quantity is 
neither a mode nor an accident because, if it were, an extended body would not be such in virtue of 
the causal power (vis) of its own substance, but in virtue of the power of something different from it: 
quantity. This seems counterintuitive. Assuming ex hypothesi that a body is extended in virtue of its 
quantity, if we subtract quantity we also eliminate the body; in like manner, a hot body is no longer 
‘hot’ without the causality of heat. The contradiction lies in imagining an extended body which could 
become unextended while still being a body. The second argument is that if quantity were a mode or 
an accident of a body, then the body would have to presuppose quantity, for quantity is not received in 
that which is not quantified already. The body would be somehow already quantified independently of 
quantity. Nor does being ‘quantified in potency’ suffice here: in fact, a body would not be extended in 
act, that is, it would not be extended in virtue of its own nature but only in virtue of that by which its 
potency is actualized. In both arguments, understanding quantity as an accident or a mode leads us 
back to the substance.32 
 Burgersdijk concludes that the bond between a body and its extension has to be stronger than the 
accident–substance and mode–substance relations. The conclusion is that quantity is matter: or better, 
that matter is quantified per se, and that only a distinction of reason, one which is produced by our 
intellect and does not obtain in nature, occurs between them. Burgersdijk draws an analogy of 
proportion: Quantity : Matter = Truth : Being. Quantity is a ‘transcendental’ of matter, just like ‘true’ 
is a transcendental of being: wherever matter is, it is essentially quantified, in the strong sense of 
‘extended in place’. 
 To conclude this section, Burgersdijk holds that: 1) quantity/extension is neither an accident nor a 
mode of matter; 2) matter is essentially quantified though not identified with extension; 3) accidents 
essentially inhere in their substance and only some qualities are accident; 4) all accidents are ‘real’ 
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accidents; 5) the ‘reality’ of accidents does not entail (metaphysical or physical) separability from 
their natural substance.33 
 
III. Descartes: Res extensa and Transubstantiation 
We have seen the Catholic view in the works of Eustachius and Suárez, a philosophically equivalent 
position in the Lutheran Scheibler and a different scholastic position in the Calvinist Franco 
Burgersdijk. In his view, accidents necessarily inhere in their substance and matter is extended per se. 
Descartes was a Catholic, so he was committed to transubstantiation. As an anti-scholastic, he rejected 
the philosophical explanation of the possibility of the Eucharistic miracle, against the Catholic 
scholastics. Rather, he argued that matter is essentially extended, much like Burgersdijk, who grounds 
this view in his Calvinist faith. With the publication of the Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (Paris: 
1641) and the Principia Philosophiae (Amsterdam: 1644), and during the Dutch controversies of the 
1640s, Descartes addressed a Calvinist readership which was discussing some versions of res extensa 
and was familiar (as he himself must have been) with the fact that at least one important Leiden 
professor had argued for it from a Calvinist perspective.34 
 Crucial stimulus came from Antoine Arnauld. In the Fourth Objections to the Meditationes 
addressed to Descartes in 1641, he questioned the compatibility of res extensa and trans-
ubstantiation.35 Arnauld’s first impression was that “the Church’s teaching concerning the sacred 
mysteries of the Eucharist cannot remain completely intact.”36 With the caveat that a philosophical 
explanation of the miracle was not to be pursued nor included as an article of faith, Arnauld remained 
open to the possibility that Descartes could preserve the dogma of the real presence as much as 
traditional scholasticism did. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether Descartes’s 
solution is consistent with Catholic orthodoxy:37 my argument is that the res extensa without the 
supporting argument that we know material substances via ‘matter in motion’ is vulnerable to charges 
of Calvinism. 
 Why was Arnauld doubtful of res extensa upon reading the Meditationes? Arnauld took issue with 
the modality of the ascription of extension to matter. In the famous example of the wax in the Second 
Meditation, Descartes concludes that the wax “surely […] is nothing other than a thing that is 
extended, flexible, and changeable.”38 The overall narrative of the Meditationes led Arnauld to the 
conclusion that extension in length, breadth, and depth is the nature of matter; that is, there is an 
identity between matter and extension. Shortly after the passage of the Fourth Objections quoted 
above Arnauld lists ‘extension’ among those properties which the Catholics believe are subtracted 
from the substance of bread, and exist without it.39 A relation of identity between matter (substance) 
and extension (accident) would make this subtraction impossible, and contradict the Catholic reading 
of the Eucharist. Robert Pasnau has argued for two interpretations of the relation between matter and 
extension in Descartes: on the first view, extension is the principal attribute of matter; on the second, 
matter is “something beneath the principal attribute – a still deeper underlying subject.”40 The main 
point is Descartes’s claim, defended in all his works and compatible with both views, that only a 
conceptual distinction occurs between matter and extension. It is an accepted principle that conceptual 
distinction entails the identity of the relata.41 According to the Catholic view extension, as an accident 
of matter, is separable from it, so it follows that it is really different from it. On the Calvinist view as 
in Burgersdijk, extension is not an accident and matter is extended per se. Although Descartes did not 
argue that matter is essentially extended for the same reasons as Burgersdijk did (hence the contingent 
agreement), Descartes’s view must have seemed to Arnauld not only prima facie incompatible with 
transubstantiation, but also dangerously close to some Calvinist views. As a Jansenist, Arnauld was 
familiar with charges of Calvinism, levelled by the establishment of the Catholic Church.42 In light of 
Arnauld’s own appreciation of Descartes’s philosophy, it is a fair assumption that behind his request 
to Descartes to show the compatibility of the doctrine of res extensa with transubstantiation there was 
also the desire to differentiate the res extensa from a possible Calvinist view. I now turn to Descartes’s 
reply. 
 In the Fourth Replies, Descartes set out to convince Arnauld that his philosophy provides an 
explanation of transubstantiation which is at least as theologically sound as the scholastic one.43 The 
crucial point is the preservation of the real presence in the host. Descartes’s strategy amounts to the 
non-scholastic explanation of our sensible knowledge in terms of ‘matter in motion’. The properties of 
an object are not manifest to us via sensible species (the forms of the properties in their intentional 
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mode of being); rather, the properties are the arrangement of the external surface of the object which 
affects our sensory system in such and such a way. The perception of certain properties of an object is 
thus explained by the corresponding arrangement of matter in the object. This theory opens up a way 
of making the res extensa compatible with transubstantiation. According to Descartes’s tentative 
explanation of the miracle (Descartes always regarded his explanations of transubstantiation as 
possible explanations, and Arnauld received them as such), it is sufficient that God maintains 
throughout transubstantiation the same external surface of the host for us to perceive the host in the 
same way. The external surface is just a mode of the substance: it is the way we perceive the 
substance, not the way the substance is. So, it can be preserved without the substance, saving the 
compatibility of res extensa and transubstantiation.44 God could not preserve matter without extension 
though, because extension is the way we understand matter and the way matter is. Descartes and 
Arnauld agreed that the acceptance of the Catholic dogma does not entail the acceptance of a specific 
philosophical theory which seeks to make the miracle intelligible, so they believed that Descartes’s 
novel explanation could be acceptable, even though it dispenses with scholastic concepts. 
 One assumption is common between Descartes and the scholastics: we know substances only via 
their accidents. We do not know the substances directly, i.e., by knowing or intuiting their essences 
immediately. Our knowledge of the essence of a substance is thus inferred from the knowledge of 
their accidents. Descartes holds that “we can, however, easily be made aware of a substance by any of 
its attributes,” and that “we do not come to know a substance immediately, through being aware of the 
substance itself; we come to know it only through its being the subject of certain acts.”45 In the 
Second Meditation we can see how Descartes deploys this theory of knowledge in the example of the 
wax. We come to know what the wax is essentially (something “extended, flexible, and changeable”) 
by the elimination of those very properties which first make that substance known to us. This process 
goes on until we find what is truly essential to the wax and cannot be further subtracted from it: 
extension. Descartes contends that this conclusion is reached by the sole inspection of the mind. 
Burgersdijk and Descartes agree on the knowledge of material substances via their accidents and on 
the view that matter is extended per se, but the differences are relevant: Burgersdijk still holds the 
scholastic theory of sensible and intelligible species,46 rejected by Descartes. He believes that his view 
of matter makes sense of ‘good philosophy’, that is, Aristotelian philosophy, and also, crucially, of the 
Calvinist faith. 
 Let me recall the two problems faced by Descartes: the res extensa seems to be 1) incompatible 
with transubstantiation and, without some further qualifications, 2) too close to views defended on 
Calvinist grounds. In the Fourth Replies, Descartes achieves the desired compatibility with 
transubstantiation and differentiation from the Calvinist view by adding a novel theory of sensible 
knowledge, not originally included in the Meditationes. Although this theory of knowledge is 
motivated by the discussion of transubstantiation, it is not an ad hoc argument. Descartes offers a 
general theory of sensible knowledge which does not serve the sole purpose of making the miracle 
philosophically intelligible. Belief in the theory does not depend on belief in the miracle, though it is 
reinforced by its explanatory power of transubstantiation. The Catholic and Lutheran scholastic 
separability claim (and this is an important difference) is only based on (theological) evidence from 
the very miracle it sets out to explain. Without the miracle, Eustachius, Suárez, and Burgersdijk agree 
that the separability claim is unnecessary.47 
 From the standpoint of the theory of matter alone, Descartes’s res extensa is different from 
contemporary Catholic and Lutheran views while it is not from Burgersdijk’s. Despite Descartes’s 
unwillingness to treat theological material, the supporting arguments are thus crucial to his dialectic. It 
is only in virtue of the conjunction of the res extensa doctrine and the theory of sensible knowledge 
that compatibility with transubstantiation and difference from the Calvinist view are achieved. Yet, 
either conjunct can be held independently of the other: the view that matter is extended per se does 
not entail any specific theory of knowledge and the contrary holds too. When taken in isolation from 
the supporting arguments then, the res extensa is theologically equivalent to a Calvinist view of 
matter. 
 I have argued that there are two related concerns in Arnauld’s Fourth Objections. On the one hand, 
the res extensa ought to be a natural philosophical and metaphysical theory acceptable to a Catholic. 
On the other hand, Arnauld and Descartes could not have been unaware of the contemporary Calvinist 
philosophers who also maintained that matter is extended per se. Descartes’s arguments for the 
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compatibility of the res extensa with transubstantiation seek the double result of securing Catholic 
orthodoxy and differentiation from a Calvinist view. Descartes seeks such a differentiation with the 
argument that our sensible knowledge is explained by matter in motion. The res extensa view can be 
(and in the Meditationes is) held without the argument of the Fourth Replies. The analysis of 
Burgersdijk’s view of matter has thus highlighted that Descartes’s res extensa was not just at risk of 
being incompatible with Catholic orthodoxy but also at risk of being identified with a view explicitly 
argued for on Calvinist grounds. 
 
Conclusion 
As a Catholic and a Jansenist, Arnauld was particularly sensitive to the charges of Calvinism. It is 
plausible that the fact that a view very close to Descartes’s was defended as Calvinist on the grounds 
of the rejection of transubstantiation would have had implications for Arnauld’s acceptance of 
Cartesianism. On the topic of res extensa, the association of Cartesianism and Calvinism emerges 
polemically in the second half of the seventeenth century. One famous example is the Sentimens de 
M’ Des Cartes touchant l’essence et les proprietes du corps, opposez a la doctrine de l’Eglise, et 
conformes aux erreurs de Calvin (Paris: Ê. Michallet, 1680), by the French Jesuit Père le Valois, 
under the pseudonym of Louis de la Ville. Le Valois contends that “Calvin and the Calvinists claim, 
like Mr Descartes and the Cartesians, that the essence of the body is placed in the three dimensions 
and in an absolutely impenetrable extension.”48 Nicolas Malebranche, Pierre Bayle, and Jean-Robert 
Chouet felt compelled to publicly respond. The reactions were different: the Catholic Malebranche 
defended transubstantiation from a Cartesian perspective. The Calvinist Jean-Robert Chouet was 
unwilling to mix Cartesian philosophy and the debate on the Eucharist. The Calvinist Pierre Bayle 
instead agreed with Père le Valois on the association between Cartesianism and Calvinism, and also 
approved of it.49 On the res extensa/Calvinism association, Bayle’s position is similar to Burgersdijk’s. 
 What are we to make of the idea of a Dutch Calvinist “consensus” on a specific view of matter? By 
no means all Calvinist philosophers and theologians agreed on this view, nor considered it as a 
consequence of their faith. The res extensa, one of the foundational views of the Meditationes, had 
been defended prior to Descartes by ‒ amongst others ‒ David Gorlaeus and Franco Burgersdijk, from 
perspectives as diverse as anti-scholastic atomism and academic Aristotelianism. Gijsbert Voet does 
not seem to argue for the separate existence of matter before information.50 Gilbert Jack (Jaccheus), 
professor of philosophy in Leiden in the 1610s and 1620s, taught that “it is probable that [quantity and 
the material substance] are really different.”51 On the contrary, Gijsbert Voet’s son Paul Voet defends a 
version of the Scotistic view that matter is endowed with a metaphysical or entitative act and that it 
has an essence on its own: matter is “a substance, endowed with extension of parts.”52 Concerning the 
attribution of extension to matter, he claims that: “then, as it is clear, matter is not itself extension, yet 
it is truly extended, and extension is either its substantial mode, or its proper accident.”53 Burgersdijk 
would agree with the first part of the claim, whereas the view that extension is the proper or principal 
attribute of matter has been ascribed to Descartes.54 
 Considerations from Calvinist orthodoxy were important: Burgersdijk makes it clear in arguing for 
a reductionist account of matter and against the separability claim ‒ solely dictated by the scholastic 
explanation of the dogma of transubstantiation. Paul Voet claims that “we should not listen to the 
Scholastics, who claim that this condition [being extended as the condition for receiving forms] can 
be subtracted from matter by divine power, while matter still concurs as the material cause.”55 Neither 
Burgersdijk nor Paul Voet argued for theories of the res extensa out of appreciation for Cartesianism; 
rather, they thought them coherent with the Calvinist rejection of transubstantiation and dictated by 
good scholastic philosophy. The Groningen professors’ generalisation that “long before Descartes, 
Orthodox theologians have supported several of [Descartes’s] ideas” does not seem to portray the 
totality of Dutch Calvinist philosophers but it is supported by at least some cases. Hence, Descartes 
found in the Dutch audience one which was familiar with the res extensa view and, importantly, not 
entirely hostile to it. A more extensive investigation of Dutch pre-Cartesian philosophy, especially 
academic, will help shed further light on how wide this alleged “consensus” was. 
 In the complex and multifaceted relations between Cartesianism and Calvinist scholastic 
philosophy agreement was possible on some specific issues. Descartes and Burgersdijk agree on the 
nature of matter and accidents, although not for the same reasons. It is plausible to think that 
agreement on such central views could facilitate the reception of Cartesianism in the United Provinces 
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(and the Calvinist countries in general) and contribute to its early success. On the central issue of the 
Eucharist, the Calvinist scholastics did not identify in Descartes’s metaphysics and natural philosophy 
a “Catholic” philosophy, but long-held Calvinist scholastic views. 
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Notes 
 
1 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 83−4. 
2 Both Clauberg and Wittichius studied at Groningen and had a positive attitude toward Cartesianism, which 
they sought to reconcile with Calvinist scholasticism. On Clauberg, see Verbeek, Johannes Clauberg. 
3 Gaukroger, Descartes. An Intellectual Biography, 4. 
4 Between 1620 and his death in 1635, he was there professor of logic, moral philosophy, and natural 
philosophy. His textbooks were widely read and reprinted in the Protestant world. Verbeek, Descartes and the 
Dutch, 37 et seq. 
5 With the exception, to my knowledge, of Bos (ed.), Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635) Neo-aristotelianism in 
Leiden. I disagree with van Ruler, “Franco Petri Burgersdijk and the case of Calvinism within the neo-scholastic  
tradition”, 36−55, who identifies no specific “Calvinist” elements in Burgersdijk’s metaphysics and portrays it 
as essentially Suarezian. 
6 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, 37. 
7 Gaukroger, Descartes. An Intellectual Biography, 210. Descartes enrolled in 1630 as a student of mathematics. 
8 Hattab, Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms, 161; Lüthy, David Gorlaeus (1591-1612), 93. 
9 Hattab, Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms, 161. 
10 Lüthy, David Gorlaeus, 85−6. 
11 I have treated the Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist theories of accidents in Gellera, “Calvinist metaphysics 
and the Eucharist.” The present paper is a development and expansion of those arguments. 
12 As in the Canon 2 of 11 October 1551, at the Council of Trent: “conversionem totius substantiae panis in 
corpus et totius substantiae vini in sanguinem, manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini”, cited in Daly, “The 
Council of Trent,” 165. 
13 I understand the Lutheran view of real presence as a commitment to consubstantiation. See Jensen, “Luther 
and the Lord's Supper,” 323−325, 330. 
14 Leijenhorst, “Place, Space and Matter in Calvinist Physics,” 522. 
15 Suárez, Metaphysicarum disputationum libri duo, 40, 2, 8: “Approbatur sententia reipsa distinguens 
quantitatem a substantia. Atque haec sententia est omnino tenenda; quamquam enim non possit ratione naturali 
sufficienter demonstrari, tamen ex principiis Theologiae convincitur esse vera, maxime propter mysterium 
Eucharistiae.” [Translations are my own. Emphasis is original unless otherwise stated] 
16 Eustachius, Summa Philosophiae Quadripartita, 4, Tractatus de principiis entis, 2, 8: “Inhaerentiam quidem 
aptitudinalem in formali ratione accidentis contineri; verum inhaerentiam actualem saltem ex natura rei ab 
accidentis natura seu essentia esse diversam […] inhaerentia proprie dicta, quae est actualis, diversa [est] ab 
accidentis essentia.” 
17 For the analysis of the standard Catholic view, see Des Chene, Physiologia, 100. Since what quantity 
attributes to matter naturally is extension in place (p. 100), hereafter I shall equate quantity and extension.  
18 Scheibler, Metaphysica duobus libris, 2, 6, 2 and 4. 
19 Burgersdijk, Institutionum metaphysicarum: based on his lectures, was first published posthumously in 1637. 
20 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 2. 17. 12: “Non sunt ergo alia accidentia dicta quam qualitates: sed an omnes 
qualitates pro accidentibus habenda, id est, pro Entibus reipsa distinctis a substantia cui insunt? Nullo modo  
[…] Qualitates primi et tertii generis vera esse accidentia existimo: atque secundi generis sunt modi sunt solum 
immediate afficientes ipsam rerum ουσιαν seu substantiam.” 
21 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 2. 17. 1: “Quaecunque substantiis attribuntur, nec tamen in earum essentia aut 
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definitione continentur.” 
22 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 2. 17. 2: “In hac definitione tria recensentur primo ut insit in aliquod [...] secundo 
ut non insit ut pars, id est, ut non pertineat ad essentiam aut integritatem ejus cui inest: tertio ut separatim ab eo  
cui inest, nequeat existere, id est, ut ejus esse sit inesse.” 
23 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 2. 17. 17 : “Accidens existere separatum implicat contradictionem. [...] Nam cum 
accidentis esse sit inesse, non erit accidens, quod non inerit substantiae: accidens ergo separatum existens, erit 
accidens non accidens; imo non solum erit non accidens, sed substantia: nam quod non est in subjecto, per se 
subsistit, et quod per se subsistit, est substantia. [...] Nam per se subsistere, et esse in subjecto, immediate 
opponuntur.” 
24 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 2. 17. 18: “Causalitas materiae aut subjecti involvit imperfectionem indigna Deo; 
sequitur enim, Deum subjectum esse accidentium, si ipse accidentia separata conservet causalitate materiali.” 
25 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 1. 15. 6: “Distinctio ex natura rei rebus per se competit absque ope et respectu ad 
intellectum. Haec distinctio ex separatione cognoscitur; nam quaecunque separari possunt, distinguuntur ex 
natura rei. Separari dicuntur, quae diversis locis aut temporibus existunt; ut quae sunt in subjectis reipsa 
diversis: non etiam ea, quorum unum existit sine altero.” 
26 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 1. 15. 6: the example is that ‘Alexander’ is also ‘the son of Philip’, but if 
Alexander ceases to be the son of Philip, he does not cease to be Alexander. 
27 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 1. 15. 6. 
28 For example in Suárez, Disputationes, 16, 1, 2. 
29 A reductionist view is also in Institutionum, 1. 25. 7, where Burgersdijk argues that there is no difference 
between substantial forms and accidents with respect to existence because they all depend on matter. 
30 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 1. 7. 1: “Modus esse positiva quaedam, interna, et absoluta appendicula, qua res 
modificata, vel quoad esse, vel quoad fieri, ut ita dicam, limitatur.” 
31 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 1. 14. 7. 
32 Burgersdijk, Institutionum, 2. 17. 6: Quantitas [...] non nisi ratione distinguitur a substantia corporea, ad 
eamque ita se habet ut veritas ad Ens; ut ergo veritas non est accidens Entis, ita quoque magnitudo non est 
accidens corporis; si enim quantitas esset accidens corporis, corpus extensum foret non vi suae substantiae; sed 
vi et causalitate quantitatis; at hoc falsum est; nam si extenderetur corpus vi quantitatis, sublata quantitatis 
causalitate, corpus ne foret quidem; sicut corpus non est calidum sublata causalitate caloris; ac sublata 
causalitate quantitatis, corpus nihilominus foret quantum, quia si corporis quantitas esset accidens corporis, 
corpus quantitatem praesupponeret; quantitas enim non recipitur in eo quod quantum non est.” 
33 The differences between Gorlaeus and Burgersdijk are now apparent. David Gorlaeus anticipated Descartes in 
rejecting hylomorphism and in defending a substance/mode metaphysics. As an atomist and an Arminian he was 
an outsider among the Dutch philosophers and the target of Gijsbert Voet’s hostility (Hattab, Descartes on 
Forms and Mechanisms, 159–160). Burgersdijk was a different type of intellectual: Aristotelian, academic, an 
establishment figure. He found the arguments for the essential extension of matter within Aristotelianism. 
34 In fact, Descartes mentions the Calvinist position: “la transsubstantiation, qui les calvinistes reprennent 
comme impossible à expliquer par la philosophie ordinaire, est très facile par la mienne.” Descartes to Vatier, 
22 February 1638, Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. 1, 564. Plausibly, Descartes had in mind the traditional Calvinist 
reluctance to mix theology and philosophy but also the Calvinist contention that the separability claim of the 
Catholics contradicts the natures of substance and accidents. Hence, the “impossibility to explain”. 
35 On Arnauld’s position on Cartesianism and the relation between theology and philosophy, Nadler, “Arnauld, 
Descartes, and Transubstantiation,” 229–46. 
36 Quoted in Nadler, “Arnauld, Descartes and Transubstantiation,” 232. Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. 7, 217. 
37 The reaction of the Roman Church was hostile and Descartes’s works were put in the Index librorum 
prohibitorum in 1663. 
38 Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. 7, 30–31. 
39 Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. 7, 217. 
40 Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 145. 
41 Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 147. 
42 Nadler, “Arnauld, Descartes and Transubstantiation,” 239. 
43 Descartes confidently wrote: “Il n’y aura, ce me semble, aucune difficulté d’accommoder la théologie à ma 
façon de philosopher; car je n’y vois rien à changer que pour la transsubstantiation, qui est extrêmement claire 
et aisée par mes principes. Et je serais obligé de l’expliquer en ma physique...” Descartes to Mersenne, 28 
January 1641, Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. 3, 295−6 (my emphasis). What to change “in his way of doing 
philosophy” is what I call below the “supporting view” of knowledge via matter in motion, which is not present 
in the Meditationes. 
44 Descartes’s argument is in Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. 7, 248–56. 
45 Quoted in Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 136–7. Pasnau calls this view the “veiled–subject doctrine.” 
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46 Franco Burgersdijk, Collegium Physicum, Disputatio 26. 
47 See sections I and II of this paper. 
48 “Calvin et les Calvinistes soûtiennent, comme M. des Cartes et les Cartesiens, que l’essence du corps consiste 
dans les trois dimensions et dans une étenduë absolument impenetrable.” Louis de la Ville/Père le Valois, 
Sentimens, 292. 
49 Heyd, Between Orthodoxy and Enlightenment, 75; Adam, L’eucharistie chez les penseurs français du dix- 
septième siècle, 172–80; Ariew, Descartes and the Scholastics, 220. 
50 Though the point might require further research. Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy,  
1625-1750, 240. 
51 Jack, Primae philosophiae, VI.3 
52 Voet, Prima Philosophia Reformata, 20, 2.8: “Substantia, partium extensione praedita.” 
53 Voet, Prima Philosophia Reformata, 20, 2.8, 2: “Tum, ut constaret, materiam non esse ipsam extensionem, 
Verum esse extensam, et extensionem esse vel ejus modum substantialem, vel ejus accidens proprium.” 
54 Hattab, Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms, 136‒140, discusses this view. Pasnau, Metaphysical 
Themes, 145 and following, argues for this interpretation within a substance/accident metaphysics in Descartes. 
55 Voet, Prima Philosophia Reformata, 20, 8.15: “Neque hic audiendi Scholastici, qui hanc conditionem a 
Materia per divinam potentiam abesse posse, censent, etiam dum ut causa materialis concurrit. Voet clearly has 
the Catholic scholastics in mind here. 
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